Network scanning tools play a major role in Internet security. They are used by both network security researchers and malicious actors to identify vulnerable machines exposed on the Internet. ZMap is one of the most common probing tools for high-speed Internet-wide scanning. We present novel identification methods based on the IPv4 iteration process of ZMap. These methods can be used to identify ZMap scans with a small number of addresses extracted from the scan. We conduct an experimental evaluation of these detection methods on synthetic, network telescope, and backbone traffic. We manage to identify 28.5% of the ZMap scans in real-world traffic. We then perform an in-depth characterization of these scans regarding, for example, targeted prefix and probing speed.
Introduction
Internet wide scanning tools are commonly used by privacy and security researchers and malicious actors. Use cases range from anti-censorship techniques [25, 37] or computer security [19] research, to commercial services [4, 15] and malicious mass-exploitation [18] . Leonard et al. [27] proposed the seminal work regarding high-speed uniformly spread Internetwide scanning. Durumeric et al. and Robert Graham then published two tools, ZMap [9, 17] and Masscan [22] , that considerably eased Internet-wide scanning. This lead to a constant use increase [29] . Security administrators monitor their networks to detect attacks at several stages such as reconnaissance, exploitation or command and control. Incident response teams analyze network traffic logs to determine root causes of compromise. Network scans are reconnaissance events, and thus interest security administrators (as occurring events) and incident response team (as security incident root cause). These actors, however, often have trouble understanding probing scope and purpose.
Previous work [14, 16, 29] analyzed ZMap usage in the wild. These works use heuristics [14, 16] , signatures [29] , and the fact that ZMap sets the IP ID field to 54321, to identify ZMap traffic. They also rely on privileged points of view on traffic: a network telescope slightly smaller than a /9 prefix for [16] , and backbone traffic containing prefixes adding up to a /13 prefix in [29] . Security administrators usually operate smaller networks. It is thus more difficult for them to detect incoming probing traffic [28] , and to assess its nature.
Our goal is to identify ZMap scans and associated internal characteristics from short sequences of observed packets. We propose new methods to identify ZMap scans with or without the IP ID fingerprint. These identification methods also recover targeted prefix which can be used by administrators and incident response teams to determine probing purpose. For example, administrators can quickly discard indiscriminate Internet-wide probing, and focus on scans that specifically target their network. By recovering the internal state of ZMap, we can also predict future probed addresses, and block related scanning traffic. Similarly, incident response teams can use our identification methods to investigate scanning that targeted a compromised host. Our methods are thus useful for both real-time use cases (e.g. scan detection and probed IP address prediction and blocking), and a posteriori ones (e.g. network traffic forensics). Finally, we provide an in-depth characterization of ZMap scans that goes beyond existing work [14, 16, 29] , for example regarding scan progress, packet rates and unnecessary probing.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we propose two cryptoanalysis methods to identify ZMap scanning. Second, we evaluate efficiency and computing cost using synthetic data and real-world traffic captured from both network telescope and backbone traffic. Third, we provide an in-depth analysis of ZMap usage in the wild. We thus identify misuses, such as private IP address probing and packet rate above upstream capacity, that waste network resources.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 present existing work on probing and ZMap scan analysis. Section 3 details relevant aspects of ZMap design and implementation.
ZMap overview
We describe the process used by ZMap to iterate over the IPv4 address space. This process relies on modular arithmetic in a finite field F p defined by a prime number p. Mathematical background can be found in [13] .
The structure of the iterator can be decomposed into two parts: the internal state s that is updated over the integers of F p and the function f that maps the internal state into an IPv4 address.
Internal state
At the initialization of the scan, a prime number p is selected according to the number of IPv4 addresses to scan. If we denote n this number of addresses, then p is the smallest prime number among the integers {p 0 , ..., p 4 } to be be greater or equal to n. The prime numbers p 0 , ..., p 4 are predefined by the ZMap implementation: p 0 = 2 8 + 1, p 1 = 2 16 + 1, p 2 = 2 24 + 43, p 3 = 2 28 + 3 and p 4 = 2 32 + 15. (a) Original sharding [9] (b) New pizza-like sharding [5] Figure 1: Sharding mechanisms used in ZMap.
A primitive root g of F p and the initial internal state s 0 are also randomly generated at the beginning of each scan. If the random generator has good randomness properties, we can suppose that these values are unique and characterize each scan. Then, at each step i in {1, ..., p − 2}, the state s i is updated according to the formula:
ZMap supports distributed scans over several instances. If this option is activated, the address generation process is parallelized between the instances by splitting the sequence of states into shards of equal length. To perform this task, ZMap implements two types of sharding techniques that depend on the software version.
Prior to a ZMap commit [5] on September 15, 2017, the sharding technique was realized as follow : let d be the number of instances that perform the distributed scan. At the initialization step, a primitive root g and a random number s 0 in F p are shared between all the instances. Then, each instance indexed by k in {0, ..., d − 1} generates its own initial internal state s 0,k = s 0 · g k and the internal state s i,k is updated according to the formula:
If we denote Shard k the set of internal states generated by the instance k, then
and the sets Shard k are disjoint. This allows to cover the whole address space to scan without repetition of an address into different shards. This method is depicted in Figure 1a .
Since the ZMap version of September 15, 2017 [5] , the sharding technique has been modified. Each Shard k contains the consecutive states s i (i in {k · p − 2/d , ..., (k + 1) · p − 2/d − 1}) that would have been obtained with a non distributed scan . This is depicted in Figure 1b . With our previous notations, the internal state of the instance k is initialized with s 0,k = s 0 · g k· p−2/d and is updated according to:
In all these three settings, the choice of the values (g, s 0 ) is important as these values can be used to characterize the scan. Two scans with the same couple of values (g, s 0 ) will generate the same IPv4 sequence of addresses. In the case of distributed scans, it can also be used to identify the machines that cooperate to the same scan. ZMap generates these values pseudo-randomly by applying the block cipher AES to a selected seed. By default, ZMap obtains the seed randomly from the Unix /dev/random device. The user can, however, specify a seed as an option (-e) or in the configuration file. Hence, when the user repeatedly launches ZMap with a specific seed, the same values (g, s 0 ) are generated and the same sequence of addresses will be probed.
Mapping function
The sequence of scanned IPv4 addresses is obtained by applying a mapping function f to the current internal state at each step of the ZMap generation process.
The function f is built at the initialization of the scan and depends on two parameters: a whitelist of IPv4 addresses W and a blacklist B. The whitelist W contains the addresses that the user has specified to scan and the blacklist B contains the addresses to skip. Hence, if S is the set of IPv4 addresses that will eventually be scanned, we have the relation S = W \ B.
The function f is a one-to-one mapping from the integers {1, ..., n} to the address set S. The address sequence (ip 1 , ..., ip n ) is then obtained by applying f to the internal states s i when s i ≤ n, as described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 IPv4 sequence generation (ip j ) j∈{1,...,n} j ← 0 for i ∈ {1, ..., p} do Update s i using Eq. 1 (or Eq. 2,3 in case of sharding)
The construction of f relies on a tree structure T that speeds up the computation of the addresses. T is a binary tree that is built at the initialization of the scan, when the address lists W and B are provided. The leaves of T represent disjoint subnets of S and the union of the leaves covers S. The network representation t l of a leaf l in T is the following: for each node, we assign the label 0 to the left part of the tree under the node and 1 to the right part. With this coding, a leaf l of T can be represented as a finite sequence (x 1 , ..., x q ) of node selections where x i ∈ {0, 1}. Using the CIDR notation, we associate to l, the subnet t l ⊆ S whose prefix address is the bits (x 1 , ..., x q ) and the prefix length is q. Furthermore, by construction of T , we enforce that, for each leaf l, t l is maximal in S in the sense that there is no subnet t ⊆ S with t l ⊆ t and prefix length smaller than q.
At each level i, the nodes of T are labeled with the number of addresses in S that fall in the subnet of prefix length i defined by the node. When the building process of T is finished, the mapping of an index x ≤ n to an address is performed by efficiently computing f 0 (x) = ip where ip is the xth address in the list S ordered by the integer comparison of the host byte representation of the IPv4 addresses. This computation is performed by applying recursively Algorithm 2 to the tree T .
Algorithm 2 Index to address function
is the sequence that codes the leaf return the IPv4 address corresponding to ip else Let T 0 the left subtree of T Let T 1 the right subtree Let n 0 the label of the left node of T (number of addresses in the left subtree)
Radix table
In the last versions of ZMap (starting from v1.1.0 which was released on November 18th 2013), a lookup table called the radix table is used for speeding up the computation of the addresses in addition to the tree T . The radix table R contains the CIDR addresses of all the subnets of prefix length 20 included in S. For these versions of ZMap, the mapping function f can be decomposed into two subfunctions f 0 and f 1 . If the index x ∈ {1, ..., n} is less than n R · 2 12 , where n R is the length of the radix table, then the radix table R is used for the computation and f (x) = f 1 (R, x). On the other hand, if x > n R · 2 12 , then the tree T built on the remaining addresses of S is used and f (x) = f 0 (T, x − n R · 2 12 ). 
ZMap detection methods
We present two detection methods of ZMap scans based on the cryptanalysis of the IPv4 address generation. These methods find the generator of the scan g given a few samples of IPv4 addresses extracted from the scan.
Observation network
We denote by O the set of IPv4 addresses that are monitored by the administrator of a network. In the case of an Internetwide scan, some of the scanned addresses of S will reach the observed network O. We then make several hypotheses.
First, the administrator can retrieve a significant part of these addresses, and determine their arrival order. Notice that we do not assume that all the scanned addresses that lay in the set O are observed by the administrator: some loss can occur during the capture of the packets. However, the capture quality (packet loss rate and packet reordering) and the monitored network size both affect the performance (speed and success) of our detection methods.
Second, we also suppose that the observation network is completely included in a subnet of the scanned addresses. Formally, if we order the monitored addresses by their host byte representation, we suppose that there is no IPv4 address
This occurs when O is a single subnet and there is no blacklisted address in O. Durumeric et al. [16] reported that they received exclusion requests for 5.4 millions IP addresses. They thus added 21,094 subnets of prefix length 24 to the default blacklist [7] . This represents 0.1% of all subnets of prefix length 24. It means that if O is a subnet of prefix length 16 (resp. 20), and we consider the worst case where the blacklisted subnets are uniformly distributed among the remaining subnetworks of prefix length 24, then, the probability that O fulfill our hypothesis is 72% (resp. 98%). This hypothesis on the observation network can greatly simplify the computation of the mapping function described in Section 3 as we show in the following Theorem. Theorem 1. Suppose that there is a subnet I such that O ⊆ I ⊆ S. Then there is an integer that we denote offset such that for all x ∈ {1, ..., n} with f
where hton is the function that converts host bytes to IPv4 addresses.
Proof. Let first assume that there exists a subnet I of size 2 12 with 
Now assume that ZMap still supports radix 
However, it is easy to notice that if we write
Therefore offset j = offset 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., k}. Finally, assume that ZMap does not support radix computation or that the maximal size of the subnet I ⊇ O is less than 2 12 . Then we have f (x) = f 0 (T, x). Since I is a subnet of S, I is included in a subnet I represented by a leaf l of T . By definition f 0 (T, x) is the jth address of the subnet I , with j = x − x 0 , and x 0 is the index of the first address of I . Hence we have f 0 (T, x) = hton(N + j) with N the host byte representation of the prefix I . Therefore
At first glance, the second and the last hypotheses of the proof lead to the same result and it seems useless to fulfill the strongest hypothesis that I has size ≥ 2 12 . There is, however, a difference that has an impact on the detection: when the monitored network is included in a subnet of size ≥ 2 12 with no blacklisted address and ZMap supports radix table, then there are only 2 20 possible values of offset. If the detection method requires to compute the list of indices from the observed addresses, then we may have to test 2 20 offsets, instead of 2 32 values in the last hypothesis of the proof.
Detecting local scans
The first detection method that we present can be applied to the scans for which S ⊆ O. This case occurs when the observation network O is a large subnet of Internet (e.g. with prefix length 16), or if we want to detect small scans that are local to the observation network (e.g. scans of prefix length 24 in an observation network of prefix length 22).
We also assume that the size of the scan n is close to the prime number p used at the initialization of the scan. This means that the subnet specified by the user (i.e. the whitelist W ) is a subnet of prefix length 8, 16, 24, 28 or 32 and the blacklist B is disproportionately small compared to the size of the whitelist.
Let o 1 , o 2 , and o 3 be three consecutively observed IPv4 addresses. As described in Section 3, there is a sequence of internal states
From the hypothesis on the small difference between n and p, there is a high probability that s i 1 +1 and s i 1 +2
are less than n.
e. the internal states of consecutively observed addresses are also consecutive. We can apply the following theorem to retrieve g.
Proof. From Theorem 1, h j = s j + offset for j in {1, 2, 3}. By definition of the ZMap iteration process, we have h i ≡ s 1 · g i−1 + offset (mod p) where the symbol ≡ denotes the congruence relation in the modular arithmetic. We deduce
Since g is a primitive root, g = 1 and we have the result.
The description of the detection method is given in Algorithm 4. Note that it does not require any hypothesis on the offset value of the mapping function f . Once g is known, it is possible to retrieve this value by computing s i = (h2 − h 1 )/(g − 1) mod p and offset = h 1 − s i . This gives additional information on the scanned addresses set S by using Theorem 1.
Detecting Internet-wide scans
We propose a second detection method that can be applied on scans whose scope is much wider than the observation network. Even if the monitored network size has an impact on the computation time of the detection algorithm (see Section 4.5 and Section 5.1), it is possible to detect internet-wide scans by using small monitored networks. The method requires at least 20 packets for a high probability of success (see below). Contrary to the previous method, it does not require consecutive packets. In other words, packet loss does not impact the success of this method.
Let h j the host byte representation of o j for j ∈ {1, ..., m} g ←
This detection method relies on the following Theorem: 
is strictly increasing. Furthermore, suppose that k satisfies the property above, and let r = gcd(e 2 , ..., e m ) and k = k · r. Then, with some additional assumptions on the discrete log distribution, we have
where Pr is the probability measure and φ is the Euler's totient function.
Proof. Let (i 1 , ..., i m ) the sequence of state indexes such that h j = s i j + offset = ((s 0 · g i j ) mod p) + offset for j in {1, ..., m}. Let δi j = i j − i 1 for j in {2, ..., m}. δi 2 , ..., δi m is an increasing sequence and if k = log(g), then δi j = e j . This proves the existence of k.
Notice that if δi m p and if r is an integer with r < p δi m and r coprime with p−1, then the sequence r ·δi 2 , ..., r ·δi m is also increasing and r · δi j = e j for k = log(g) · r −1 mod (p − 1).
Let
δi m and r coprime with p − 1}.
If k ∈ A, by assuming that gcd(δi 2 , ..., δi m ) = 1 then we have r = gcd(e 2 , ..., e m ) and therefore log(g) = gcd(e 2 , ..., e m ) · k. Now suppose that k ∈ A and we want to estimate the probability that k satisfies the property of the theorem (A is the empty set if o 1 , ..., o m are not generated by a ZMap scan). We assume that for any k, the sequence (e j ) j∈{2,...,m} defined by k is equidistributed. This assumption stems from the fact that discrete logarithm has an uniform distribution on arithmetic subsets of F p when p → ∞ as stated in [20] . Let Pr k (e 2 < ... < e m ) the probality that the sequence (e 2 ,...,e m ) defined for a fixed k is increasing. Then for k ∈ A, Pr k (e 2 < ... < e m ) = 1 (m−1)! as there are (m − 1)! permutations of {2, ..., m} and each ordering of (e j ) j∈{2,...,m} can be defined by one of these permutations. We also assume that the probabilities that (e j ) j∈{2,...,m} is not increasing are independent for (almost) all k. Hence, the probability that for all k ∈ A, (e j ) j∈{2,...,m} is not increasing can be bounded from below by ∏ k coprime with (p−1)
. Therefore, if k defines an increasing sequence (e j ) j∈{2,...,m} , then
. The description of the ZMap detection algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.
for j ∈ {2, ..., m} do f j ← log a h j −offset h 1 −offset mod p with h j the host byte representation of o j end for for k ∈ {1, ..., p − 1} and k coprime with p − 1 do for j ∈ {2, .., m} do e j ← f j · k if e j ≤ e j−1 then break end if if j = m then r ← gcd(e 2 , ..., e m ) return g = a k·r end if end for end for return "not a ZMap scan"
The discrete logarithm log a can be efficiently computed by using baby-step giant-step algorithm [35] or PohligHellman algorithm [33] . The computation complexity of the discrete logarithm is O( √ p) for baby-step giant-step
i for PohligHellman. Since the value of p is at most p 4 = 2 32 + 15, we can expect to perform the computation respectively in 2 16 or 2 10 operations. The iteration of k amongst the numbers coprime with p − 1 can also be efficiently performed by precomputing the list of such coprime numbers and storing them into a file. During the main iteration loop of Algorithm 5, the file takes at most 4 · φ(p 4 − 1) = 4, 5 GB in memory. Actually, the critical part of the algorithm is the multiplication of the f j by k which is performed j m · φ(p − 1) times in the worst case of a full iteration over the coprime integers ( j m is the mean value of the least j ≤ m such that e j ≤ e j−1 , with the assumptions on the discrete log distribution of Theorem 3 we can show that j m = e ≈ 2.72). This results in j m · φ(p − 1) = 2.72 · 1136578560 ≈ 2 32 operations with p = p 4 .
The number of IPv4 addresses m extracted from the scan has also an impact on the success of the detection method.
the upper bound of the failure probability of Theorem 3 with m addresses. In the context of ZMap scan detection, this failure probability corresponds to the false positive rate. For p 4 = 2 32 + 15, we have θ(14, p 4 ) = 0.16, θ(15, p 4 ) = 0.013, θ(17, p 4 ) = 5.4 · 10 −5 , and θ(20, p 4 ) = 9.3 · 10 −9 . As we test a high volume of scans in our experiments, we select m = 20 for our implementation of the detection tool to avoid false positives. Also note that, when the offset value is known, the false negative rate is equal to 0.
Offset computation
The drawback of the detection method Det2 is that it requires to know the offset value of the generated IPv4 addresses (Section 4.1). However, this value can be retrieved in two special cases. The first case is when the scan does not use any black- where p r(k) is the prime number associated to the size of the network t k . This overall detection method managed to identify and characterize a large amount of ZMap scans, as we will see later in our experiments (see Section 5).
Offset brute forcing
When ZMap uses a custom blacklist, the detection and the characterization of the scan can be performed by brute forcing the offset value. If we assume that ZMap supports radix table for IPv4 computation as described in Section 3 and that the observation network O is included in a subnet I ⊆ S of size ≥ 2 12 (which is the case when O is a subnet with no blacklisted IP and S is an Internet-wide scan), we have shown in As we have shown in Theorem 3, if k is in A then k satisfies Γ, and the probability that k satisfies Γ if k is not in A is very small. Therefore
From our hypothesis on the discrete logarithm distribution, we can assume that A is equally distributed in the integers coprime with p − 1. Hence 
where α is the false negative rate of the restricted algorithm.
By fixing the false negative rate α, the minimum number of integers k max to test is equal to
.
If we apply the restricted algorithm 2 20 times for an exhaustive search of the offset value, then the overall false negative rate is equal to 1 − (1 − α) 2 20 and the mean number of operations is equal to k max · e · 2 20 . Let consider the case of the detection and the characterization of ZMap Internet-wide scans with a custom blacklist of IP addresses where S = S Internet and O is a /16 subnet. If we want to achieve a false negative rate α = 10 −8 for the restricted version of Algorithm 5, then we can limit the number of integers coprime with p − 1 to k max = 2 25 . The overall false negative rate is equal to 0.01 and the overall number of operations for each scan is equal to 2 46 . This takes roughly 15 days on a single core of a Intel Xeon E7-4820.
Summary
We summarize the detection methods' usages regarding scan types in Table 1 .
Results
This section presents our identification and characterization results using Det2 and pre-computed offsets on synthetic and real network traffic. We do not run the Det1 method because the odds of observing three consecutive packets inside our datasets (see Section 5.2.1) are very low. We also do not run the offset bruteforcing method because computing costs are too expensive (see Section 4.5). The method used hereafter in this section is Det2 with pre-computed offsets.
Synthetic data
In this section, we analyze the detection performance of the method Det2 using synthetic data. We collect destination IP address sequences using the -d (or -dryrun) option of ZMap. For each prefix size between 0 and 24, we generate 100 sequences of ZMap scans with different seeds. Then, we restrict each of these sequences to the IPv4 addresses that lay into the observation network of the given prefix size. We also ensure that we generate enough packets so that each scan contains 20 packets in the observation network.
Size of observed prefix O vs detection runtime
In order to evaluate Det2 runtime, we measure the mean number of coprimes tested in the main loop of Algorithm 5 for different observation network sizes. We use a single thread to generate the packets. The detection method Det2 identify all the ZMap scans and retrieve the correct generator g. 
Number of threads vs detection success
ZMap uses an option (-T) to control the number threads that send probing packets. Threads use sharding (see Section 3.1) to share packet sending. Using several threads may alter the packet sending order and thus impacts detection success. Before December 6th, 2016 [3] , the default number of threads was the number of cores of the machine. In the current version of ZMap (post [3] ), the default number of thread is one. Figure 3 depicts the method success rate against the number of threads used for several sizes of observed prefix O. We here use the first 20 packets observed as input to the Det2 method. We observe that smaller numbers of threads yield higher success rates. This is expected because when the thread number increases, the odds of observing a sequence from distinct threads that cannot be identified also increase. Bigger prefix sizes yield a smaller success rate for all configurations. The first 20 packets are quicker to obtain with small prefix sizes. We thus hypothesize that, for small prefix sizes, observed packets are often sent by the first launched thread. As the prefix size increases, the first 20 packets are increasingly sent by distinct threads which alter the original order.
Real world traffic
This section presents our identification and characterization results on real-world data. 
Pre-processing
We identify scanning IP addresses using two methods. First, we extract source IP address that have at least a packet with the ZMap fingerprint (IP ID field equals to 54321). Second, we apply the Threshold Random Walk [24] method using Zeek/Bro. We then compute the union of source IP addresses extracted by the methods above, and keep only the IP addresses that send packets to at least 5 distinct destination IPs. Individual scans performed by scanning IPs are then identified using a burst detection method [26] . Table 2 presents detected scans. We breakdown scans with more and less than 20 packets because the Det2 method needs at least 20 packets (see Section 4.3). Scan with at least 95% of packets with the ZMap fingerprint (see above) are labelled as ZMap in IP ID-related column hereafter. Overall, we identify 1,314,804 scans, and apply the Det2 method on 639,599 ones. Table 3 presents the identification results. For the telescope dataset, our method is successful on 37.8% ZMap scans using TCP and 7.5% using UDP. For the backbone dataset, percentages of successful identification are lower: 24.1% (resp. 6.9%) for TCP (resp. UDP) scans. Overall, the majority of identified scans use the default ZMap blacklist [7] . Only 3.5% (resp. 1.8%) of ZMap TCP (resp. UDP) scans in the telescope data and 5.5% of TCP scans in the backbone data do not use any blacklist. This means that they actually send packets to 
Identification results
IP addresses that are reserved such as private or multicast addresses. They are thus needlessly increasing the workload of their infrastructure and their upstream provider. We do not identify 58.5% ZMap scans using TCP and 90.5% using UDP in the telescope dataset, and 69.2% ZMap scans using TCP and 93.1% using UDP in the backbone dataset. By analyzing reverse-DNS entries, we discover probing entities that confirm to us that they use customized blacklist. In the telescope data, 60% of UDP scans with ZMap's IPID are from Rapid7 [1] , and that 11% of TCP scans with ZMap's IPID are from University of Michigan [6] . We thus hypothesize that, either unidentified scans use custom blacklists that we could not identify, or use several threads (see Section 5.1.2), or packet reordering occurred and our sampling strategy was not sufficient to cope with this problem (see Section 5.2.5). A small number of scans (22 in the telescope and 131 in the backbone) have been identified by our tool as using both the default ZMap blacklist, and no blacklist at the same time. This is due to the fact that some of the precomputed offsets offset
and offset / 0 k (as described in Section 4.4) are the same when the scanned network is small. It is therefore impossible to determine if these scans use any blacklist. The same generators are, however, returned in both cases, and it is still possible to infer additional scan characteristics.
We detect 3 scans without the ZMap specific value for IP ID field in the backbone dataset. These scans are performed by 3 IP in the same /24 prefix. They have many common characteristics: they start and finish around the same time, they use the same generator g, exhibit low visibility (i.e. we do not see all their packets, see Section 5.2.7), target the whole Internet and the destination port is 443. We thus hypothesize that a single entity uses sharding to decrease detection 
Run time
We instrument the execution time of our tool. The network telescope dataset is analyzed using a machine with 4 Intel Xeon E7-4820 (octo core with Hyper-Threading). The backbone dataset is analyzed using two machines with 2 Intel Xeon E5-2650 (octo core with Hyper-Threading). In both cases, we restrict the number of paralellized executions to avoid Hyper-Threading. Each scan is analyzed by our method using a single core. Table 4 details the measured execution time. When the identification is successful, duration averages slightly more than a minute for the telescope dataset and slightly less than a minute for the backbone data. When our method fails to identify a ZMap scan, the average run time is around 5 minutes for the telescope data and 3 minutes for backbone data.
Impact of destination IP address sequence sampling
Packet reordering occurs on devices [11] or may be caused by routing events [30] . Network traffic analysis showed diverse percentage of packet reordering: 0.3 to 2% [32] , 3.2% [36] , 1 to 1.5% [23] and 0.074% [31] . These percentages are significant and potentially threaten the result of our identification method by inverting the order of consecutive observed packets o i . In order to alleviate this problem, we actually analyze both the raw sequence of the first 20 observed packet o i and a sampled sequence. This sequence contains 20 packets spread in the raw sequence: the first packet is o 1 , the last one o c and the 18 other packets are evenly spread between o 1 and o c . Figure 4 provide an example of the sampling procedure for a scan with 41 packets. We analyze both the raw sequence {o 1 . . . o 20 } and the sampled sequence which contain o i with i = 1 . . . 41 and i an odd positive integer. Table 5 presents the breakdown of our results regarding sampling. In the telescope data, scans that were only suc- cessfully identified with sampling represent a minority of all scans: 1.8% for TCP and 4.6% for UDP. In backbone data, "sampling only" exhibits a bigger percentage of successfully identified scans: 7.8% of TCP scans and 91.4% of UDP ones. We hypothesize that the bigger monitored prefix (65,535 IP addresses in the backbone data and 768 IP addresses in the telescope data) increases the odds of observing reordered packets. Another possible explanation is that usual probing speed increased from 2015 to 2017, and thus caused a packet reordering rise. We also observe that some scan are identified with raw sequences but not with sampled sequences. We hypothesize that this is due to time-splitting errors (see Section 5.2.2). When this error happens, one or several scans using distinct generators are merged together into a single one. This causes the sampled sequence to contain observed packets from one or more scans with distinct generators. In that case, our method is not successful. Figure 5 : Example of scanned network S and observed network O with missing packet for rk = 4 due to packet loss. Table 6 details the prefix targeted by the identified ZMap scans. More than 99% of scans found in the telescope data, and more than 97% of scans identified in the backbone data, target a /0 prefix. This is expected since ZMap is one of the two main high speed scanning tools (with Masscan [22] ) that aim to perform fast and large scale probing. We however note that some scans target smaller prefixes (e.g. /16).
Targeted prefix

Scan packet visibility and scan progress
Let o 1 , ..., o m the observed probed addresses, and i 1 , ..., i m the indices of the associated ZMap states, i.e. o j = hton(s i j + o f f set) for all j ∈ {1, ..., m}. Det2 using offset computation is able to identify the generator and the prefix of the scan. with rk(o 1 ) = 1 (see Figure 5) . Formally, for each ip ∈ O let δ(ip) = i ip − i 1 where i ip is the index of the internal state that corresponds to ip (i.e. ip = f (s i ip )). Then,
We then compute two metrics. First, we note P , the progress of the scan. It is the relative position of the index of the last observed probed address within the observed IP
where l is the size of O. This value reflects the scan completion percentage. A P value lower than one, means the scan did not reach all IP addresses in the observed prefix O. This may be caused by sharding [9] , ZMap capping options (-n for probe number, -N for result number, -t for time [8] ), early interruption by user or incomplete data. Second, we note V the visibility of the scan. It is the percentage of observed probing packet: V = m rk(o m ) . When this value is lower than one, it means that some packets are missing, either due to packet loss or sharding [9] . On Figure 6 present our results. For the telescope (resp. backbone) dataset, 72% (resp 85%) of identified scans have a V greater than 95%. Scans with visibility smaller than 95% exhibit either progress smaller than 20% (67% in the telescope dataset and 30% in backbone data), or progress higher than 90% (16% in the telescope dataset and 57% in backbone data). We hypothesize that scans with low visibility exhibit low progress because they were stopped as soon as users noticed packet loss or upstream overload. Scans with visibility higher than 95% exhibit a behavior similar to those with low visibility regarding progress P . These scans' progress values are either smaller than 20% (40.8% in the telescope dataset and 99.7% in backbone data), or higher than 90% (34.8% in the telescope dataset and 0.04% in backbone data). We notice some peaks for progress value of 5 and 10% in Figure 6a . We hypothesize that these values are common for users that do not want to scan the full IPv4 address space and use the -n option in ZMap. Sharding causes visibility values lower than 50%. It is visible on the lower right part of Figure 6a and on the lower part of Figure 6b . We observe many scans with visibility values around 0.4 and 2.5% in Figure 6b . We hypothesize that these scans uses sharding among 250 and 40 distinct sources.
Generator reuse
We analyze the generator g (see Section 3.1) values identified by our method. Generator can be set using the seed option (-e) for repeatability or reproducibility purposes, or, to perform sharding (see Section 3.1) from several machines or network interfaces. We first notice that specific generators (3 and 12) are dominant across scans. Table 7 details these occurrences. We could not find an explanation to the unusual occurrence of these peculiar values. Table 8 presents generator reuse across IP addresses inside both datasets for g other than 3 and 12. We observe several instance of generator reuse across a number of IP ranging from 2 to 39. This is consistent with the sharding observed on Figure 6 . Furthermore, we notice that generator reuse mainly occur across IP located in the same /24. We hypothesize that scanning entities usually use several colocated machines or VMs from a single provider. We however notice that only 1.4% (resp 34%) of group of source IP in the telescope (resp. backbone) dataset sharing generator values have a visibility V value smaller than 50%. We thus hypothesize that the majority of generator reuse is linked to setting of a 
Emitted packet rate
The number of packets emitted between the first probe o 1 and the last one o m can be retrieved by computing δrk = rk(o m ) − rk(o 1 ). The elapsed time between the first observed packet and the last is δt = t m − t 1 (see Figure 5) . We define the emitted packet rate epr as: Figure 7 depicts emitted packet rate of scans. In order to provide reference, we build epr values for a SYN scan that uses 100Mb, 1GbE and 10GbE. We chose the SYN scan because it is the most common type of ZMap scan observed [16] . Red curves show scans that were only identified using sampled sequence while black ones represents scans identified with or without sampled sequence. Scans only identified using sampled sequence exhibit a higher emitted packet rate than other scans. We observe that scans identified without any blacklist exhibit a lower packet rate than scans detected with the default ZMap blacklist. Emitted packet rates are usually lower than 100Mb for TCP scans in the backbone dataset. Other scans (TCP and UDP for the telescope dataset and UDP for the backbone dataset) are mostly smaller than 1GbE. 1.1% of scans in the telescope dataset and 0.4% in the backbone dataset exhibit epr consistent with a throughput greater than 1GbE. Their visibility V (see Section 5.2.7) values are very small: for the telescope dataset, the median value is 3% and the mean is 4.5%, for the backbone dataset, these values are 0.04% and 1.9%. We hypothesize that high speed packet rate saturates network equipment in the upstream provider of the source IP, yielding packet losses.
Discussions
Overall, Det2 identification performance in a controlled setup are perfect (see Section 5.1.1). We however do not identify 58.5% ZMap scans using TCP and 90.5% using UDP in the telescope dataset, and 69.2% ZMap scans using TCP and 93.1% using UDP in the backbone dataset. By analyzing reverse DNS records, we find that a significant proportion of scans with ZMap's IPID originate from entities that use custom blacklists (see Section 5.2.3). Other possble explanations are the use of several threads (see Section 5.1.2), or acute packet reordering (see Section 5.2.5). While threading and packet reordering are linked to ZMap usage and network conditions, and thus beyond our reach, customized blacklist can be accounted for using offset bruteforce Section 4.5. We thus intend to accelerate offset bruteforcing using GPUs.
We identify two biases for our characterization Section 5.2. First, backbone data capture duration is 48 hours. Computed progress P (see Section 5.2.7) values of scans which were not completely captured may thus be lower than their real value. We however could not access bigger backbone dataset to increase the reliability of our data. Second, we identified and characterized 28.5% of all scans in our datasets. Our characterization results may thus be biased towards scans that were identified by the Det2 method. We want to improve our identification methods to reduce this bias.
We show in Section 4.1 that, in the context of the exclusion requests documented by Durumeric et al. [16] , if O is a /16 subnetwork, then probability that O fulfills the hypothesis regarding blacklisted addresses is 77%. This probability increases to 98% if O is a /20 subnetwork. The size difference between the backbone dataset and the telescope one may thus explain why Det2 is less successful on the backbone dataset.
The new sharding mechanism [5] introduced in September 2017 impacts some of our metrics. The progress value P of a completely observed scan will be 1 d , with d the number of shards. Our results are not affected by this change because our data was collected before it occurred. Future experiments shall however be careful when using feature like P .
Ruth et al. [34] use ICMP answers to ZMap scans to gather information on the Internet's control plane. We envision that our identification method is able to detect packet loss or packet reordering on Internet. By using several ZMap scan observation points, and by combining this input with routing information, it may be possible to locate and diagnose performance problems or failures.
[37] Eric Wustrow, Colleen Swanson, and J Alex Halderman.
Tapdance: End-to-middle anticensorship without flow blocking. In USENIX Security, pages 159-174, 2014.
Supplementary results
Observed packet rate
The number of observed packets sent by the scanning IP is m.
We note the receiving time of o 1 (resp. o m ), t 1 (resp. t m ) (see Figure 5 ). The elapsed time between the first observed packet and the last is δt = t m −t 1 . We define the observed packet rate opr as: opr = m δt = m t m −t 1 . Figure 8 presents the observed packet rate in our data. In order to provide reference for opr values, we build opr values for a SYN scan that uses standard network speeds such as 100Mb, 1GbE and 10GbE for each datasets. For example, such a scan using 1GbE would generate 0.40 packet per second in the telescope dataset, and 34 packets per second in the backbone dataset. We chose the SYN scan because it is the most common type of ZMap scan observed [16] . In both datasets, the observed packet rate of most scans with the ZMap fingerprint are consistent with a throughput smaller than 1GbE. Some scans nonetheless exhibit a throughput bigger than 1GbE. They may use the same IP on several devices to perform sharding. We however assess that this behavior is unlikely because it requires more configuration compared to standard sharding, and, above all, increases detection odds. We thus hypothesize that these scans actually targets small prefixes. We also observe that the Det2 method is less successful when opr increases. High throughput may increase packet reordering, and thus degrades our identification abilities. Figure 8 shows that scans without the ZMap fingerprint exhibit a much higher observed rate than scans with the fingerprint. We hypothesize that these scans target smaller network prefixes in higher proportion than ZMap scans. Attack success is green while failure is red. Dark green represent scans that were only identified with sampled sequence. Light green represent scans were identified with or without sampled sequence. Vertical lines represent the theoretical observed packet rates in our three /24 prefixes for a /0 SYN scan performed by ZMap using a single source with 1GbE and 10GbE upstreams.
